On 11 February, the UNSC adopted resolution 2509 (2020) extending the authorization of measures against the illicit export of crude oil. On 12 February, the UNSC endorsed resolution 2510 supporting the key points of the final communique of the Berlin Conference. On 17 February, the EU’s chief diplomat Josep Borrell announced that they agreed to establish a military mission to enforce the UN arms embargo on Libya.

On 5 February, the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Boukadoum, met the head of the LNA, Khalifa Haftar, in Rajma. On 6 February, the GNA’s Minister of Interior, Bashaagha, met with a German government delegation. On 9 – 10 February, the UN-mediated “Economic and Financial Track” Dialogue took place in Cairo. On 10 February, US Ambassador to Libya, Norland, met with Bashaagha discussing the dismantlement of militias.

On 29 January, Salamé briefed the UNSC. On 29 January, the Turkish government confirmed it had four frigates and a refuelling vessel in the central Mediterranean. The same day, Macron accused Turkey of violating the Berlin conference. On 30 January, Algerian Prime Minister Djerad proposed that his country host a Libya “reconciliation forum” on behalf of the AU. On 2 February, Algeria’s President, Tebboune, proposed a meeting for Libya’s multiple “tribes” to be held in a regional country in order to create a solution to the current Libya crisis.

On 23 January, Algerian Foreign Minister Boukadoum held a meeting with foreign ministers from Mali, Egypt, Chad, Niger, Sudan, and Tunisia, the latter five nations sharing a common border with Libya. On 23 January, Greek Prime Minister, Mitsotakis stated the EU would not agree to a political solution to the Libya crisis while the GNA and Turkey maintain their maritime MoU. On 26 January, Turkish President Erdogan, met with Algerian Prime Minister, Tebboune, in Algeria. On 27 January, German Foreign Minister Maas met EU High Representative Borrell to discuss the situation in Libya. On 27 January, UNSMIL issued a statement saying it deeply regrets the “continued blatant violations of the arms embargo in Libya”.

On 19 January, Germany held an international conference on Libya in Berlin including multiple state leaders and high-level delegates. The conference concluded with unanimous agreement on a final 55-point communiqué. The communiqué called for the UNSC to create an international committee to monitor the ceasefire and to impose sanctions on violations of the ceasefire.

On 8 January, Turkey and Russia jointly called for a ceasefire in Libya from 12 January. UN Envoy to Libya, Salame, welcomed the ceasefire and called upon the international community to make the most of the momentum to help reach a consensus through the “Berlin process”. On 8 January, Serraj refused to see Italian Prime Minister Conte after learning that Haftar had also been invited and received by the Italian leader. On 9 January, a delegation of senior US officials, met in Rome with Bashaagha and Haftar. On 11 January, Russian President Putin and German Chancellor Merkel met in Moscow to discuss Libya. On 14 January, Merkel’s office announced that she had agreed with the UN to go ahead with holding the Berlin conference on 19 January.

On 1 January, the Arab League convened an exceptional meeting in Cairo but failed to reach a consensus on how to de-escalate the conflict in Libya. On 2 January, Turkey’s parliament approved a bill to enable troops to be deployed to Libya to support the GNA. On 2 January, Egyptian President al-Sisi condemned in the “strongest terms” the Turkish parliament’s authorization. On 6 January, the GNA announced that a planned visit to Tripoli on 7 January by the newly appointed diplomat-in-chief of the EU Joseph Borrell and the foreign ministers of the UK, France, Germany and Italy had been postponed. On 6 January, Serraj arrived in Algeria to meet with the newly-elected Algerian President Tebboune.

On 17 December, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Libya and met with Serraj and Haftar. On 21 December, a senior US State Department official said that the US is “very concerned” about the intensification of the conflict in Libya. On 23 December, the EU issued a statement reiterating its calls on all Libyan parties to cease all military actions and resume the political dialogue. On 24 December, a high-profile meeting gathered together representatives from the Russian and Turkish foreign ministries. On 25 December, Turkish President Erdogan paid a surprise visit to Tunisia and met with Tunisian President Saied. On 28 December, Italian Prime Minister Conte warned that Russia and Turkey, and not Europe, are setting the agenda in Libya’s conflict. On 29 December, Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis said that Greece wants to be included in the UN-sponsored Berlin conference on the Libya conflict. On 29 December UN Envoy to Libya, Salamé, called for greater civilian protection following several incidents in western Libya.

On 12 December, the European Council condemned the maritime deal between the GNA and Turkey. On 14 December, the Security and Military MoU was introduced to the Turkish parliament. On 15 December, the head of the GNA, Fayez al-Serraj, met with high-level representatives of Qatar as well as US Republican senator Lindsay Graham. On 16 December, Turkey claimed that Russian President Putin suggested working jointly in Libya.

On 7 December, US Army General, Stephen Townsend stated that he believed Russian air defence systems were responsible for shooting down an American unarmed drone over Tripoli in November. On 5 December, the text of the maritime agreement between the GNA and Turkey was published. On 6 December, the Greek Foreign Ministry stated it had given the GNA’s Ambassador to Greece 72 hours to leave the country.

On 27 November, the GNA signed an agreement on maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea with Turkey, along with an MoU to expand security and military cooperation. On 2 December, Speaker of the Tubruq-based HoR demanded to have the MoU retracted. On 2 December, the UNSC issued a statement expressing their “deep concern at the recent escalation of violence in Libya”.

On 21 November, members of the US Senate introduced a piece of legislation called ‘the Libya Stabilization Act’. Former Libyan ambassador to the UAE, Aref al-Nayed, met with US NSC officials twice ‘this fall’. On 21 November, an AFRICOM unarmed remotely piloted aircraft was lost over Tripoli. On 20 November, an Italian Air Force MQ-9A Predator B crashed near the city of Tarhouna.

On 14 November, the US State Department released a statement directly addressing the LNA and calling on it to “end its offensive on Tripoli.” On 13 November, representatives of the US State Department started a US-Libya Security Dialogue in Washington, DC with the GNA.

In an interview on 4 November, Haftar said that Qatari and Turkish support to the GNA will probably delay his troops’ advances and framed foreign support for the LNA as counterterrorism cooperation. He wished the Berlin conference success if it ever took place.

On 3 November, the head of the GNA, Fayez al-Serraj, and US Ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland, met in London. On 2 November, Italy’s deal with the GNA on migration was automatically renewed without amendments. The GNA and UN formally reopened Mitiga airport on 29 October and said that they planned to resume flights in the next two weeks.

On 26 October, US Embassy officials travelled to Benina to meet with notable eastern figures and discuss efforts to end the fighting around Tripoli and seek justice for US victims of the 11 September 2012 attack in Benghazi. On 27 October, the German foreign minister and UN Envoy discussed the Berlin conference in Tripoli. Russia hosted its first Africa summit which was attended by Serraj and eastern government representatives.