On 3 May, an Italian frigate responded to a distress call made by seven Italian fishing boats facing attempted interception by LNA coastguard patrol boats. On 10 May, the US Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland was appointed as the US Special Envoy for Libya.

On 29 April, the fourth round of 5+5 JMC talks concluded in Sirte. On 3 May, a high-level Turkish delegation was received in Tripoli by the GNU to discuss strengthening the relations between the two countries.

On 24 April, the US Ambassador to Libya gave an interview stating that he believed members FACT had been trained by Wagner in Libya. On 26 April, Amnesty International reported that military courts in eastern Libya have convicted hundreds of civilians in unfair military trials’. Last week, the “Libya Stabilization Act” passed the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC).

On 11 April, FACT, the Libya-based Chadian rebel group, launched an attack in northern Chad. On 15-16 April, the GNU Prime Minister held talks in Moscow. On 16 April, the UNSC adopted resolution 2570.

On 12 April, Dabaiba and Erdoğan reaffirmed their commitment to the 2019 maritime agreement between Turkey and the GNA. On the same day Dabaiba met the Turkish Minister of Defence and discussed Turkey’s continued military assistance. On 12 April, the Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias visited Benghazi to hold meetings with Libyan officials

On 30 March, the Chinese Ambassador to Libya stated that China intends to reopen its Embassy in Tripoli. On 31 March, the Russian Foreign Minister stated that Russia will support Libya’s planned elections. On 6 April, Italy’s Prime Minister met the GNU Prime Minister in Tripoli.

On 25 March, the Egyptian President met the President of Libya’s Presidential Council, to discuss bilateral relations. On 26 March, the President of Libya’s Presidential Council met the Turkish President. On 27 March, the Head of UNSMIL, Jan Kubis, met the commander of the LNA, Khalifa Haftar.

On 18 March, the spokesperson of the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that Russia had discussed reopening of Russia’s Embassy in Tripoli, with Dabaiba. On 21 March, the EU High Representative announced that Operation IRINI will be extended for a further two years. On 22 March, the EU imposed sanctions on the Kaniyat militia leaders. On 22 March, GNU Prime Minister held a call with the US Secretary of State.

On 8 March, the UAE reportedly transferred military equipment and personnel to an Egyptian military base at Sidi Barrani. On 12 March, the GNA stated that Russian and Sudanese mercenaries have returned to Sirte following their brief withdrawal.

On 3 March, Israel’s Environment Protection Minister claimed a ‘Libyan-owned pirate vessel’ committed an “act of environmental terrorism” against Israel. On 4 March, the Head UNSMIL met the Russian Foreign in Moscow to discuss political and economic developments in Libya. On 5 March, reports emerged that the Russian Wagner PMC has transferred a new group of mercenaries from Syria to fight in Libya.

On 22 February, the President of the Chechen Republic discussed training for Libyan special forces with Libya’s Prime Minister designate. On 23 February, the UN Office of Military Affairs and Police stated it had the capacity to monitor the Libyan ceasefire on the ground if this is requested by the UN. On 27 February, The Times reported that that Wagner PMCs ‘no longer pretend to work for Haftar and the LNA’.

On 21 February, Reuters revealed that a report submitted to the UNSC states that Erik Prince provided private military services to the LNA. This week, members of the 5+5 JMC travelled to Moscow to discuss the ‘unofficial Russia presence’ in Libya via the Wagner Group. Reports also emerged that technicals belonging to Sudanese mercenaries departed Libya.

On 8 February, the Russian Foreign Minister, spoke to the new Prime Minister designate for Libya and the new President of the Presidency Council. On 15 February, an Egyptian delegation arrived in Tripoli to explore the reopening of the Egyptian embassy in the Libyan capital.

On 2 February, the UN published its Panel of Experts report on Sudan including details of the UAE’s involvement with the LNA in Libya. On 4 February, the UNSC instructed the UNSG to deploy international monitors in Libya. On 5 February, the LPDF elected Abdul Hameed Dabaiba as the new Prime Minister for Libya. On 6 February, the 5+5 JMC agreed to clear mines from Sirte ahead of the reopening of the coastal road.

On 27 January, the GNA’s Minister of Defence in the GNA, announced that 1,300 soldiers have received military training with Turkish forces in Libya. On 28 January, The Times reported that a Russian air defence missile system was secretly flown from Zuwwara to a US air base in Germany. On 28 January, the Acting Head of UNSMIL, Stephanie Williams, called on the UNSC to pass a resolution to dissolve all parallel executive entities. On 1 February, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) opened in Geneva.

On 21 January, UNSMIL announced the start of the nomination period for the submission of candidates for the three-member Presidency Council (PC) and the post of Prime Minister. On 23 January, the 90-day deadline for the withdrawal of foreign fighters and mercenaries from Libya, as agreed in the October 23 ceasefire, passed largely unheeded.