On 6 October, the GNA and its new UN-backed Security Arrangements Committee announced new security arrangements in Tripoli. On 7 October, the GNA announced a reshuffle of its cabinet and assigned several new ministers.

Following the conclusion of clashes in Tripoli on 25 September, the GNA is moving to redraw security arrangements in the capital through the UN facilitated Security Arrangements Committee of Greater Tripoli. In light of this the GNA Local Government Minister is hosting a meeting of municipal mayors on 2 October to discuss decentralisation and the devolution of security functions to municipalities.

On 25 September, a ceasefire was brokered between the Tripoli Protection Force and Tarhuna’s 7th Brigade that saw the latter withdraw to the areas of control agreed in the UN-brokered ceasefire of 9 September. This coincided with forces under the command of Salah Badi retreating withdrawing from the Airport road.

On 18 September, hostilities erupt between militia groups south of Tripoli despite UN ceasefire. On 17 September, the security of Tripoli’s Mitigia airport had been handed over to the Central Security Forces. On 16 September, the GNA form joint force under the leadership of the commander of the western military zone.

On 9 September, UNSMIL gathered together the key rival factions involved in the militia clashes in Tripoli that began on 26 August to sign an eight-point agreement that included a pledge to refrain from extorting sovereign institutions. This is the second meeting in over a fortnight, with the first initiating the current ceasefire.

Major conflict erupted between militias in Tripoli on 27 August that has expanded over the following days into what seems to be a semi-coordinated military campaign aimed at eradicating the power of Tripoli-based militias, by an alliance of forces primarily including Tarhuna, Misrata and Zintan.

On 26 August, the Kani militia (also known as the 7th ‘Liwa’) deployed from Tarhuna to south Tripoli. The move provoked Tripoli armed groups to deploy reinforcements to these fronts. On 27 August, clashes broke out between the militias south of Tripoli. A temporary ceasefire held on 28 August but the situation remains volatile.

On 15 August, the LNA mobilized its forces to the Oil Crescent and declared a state of emergency in the region following reports of Ibrahim Jadhran allied militias traversing to the Wadi Zamzam area.

On 14 August, the House of Representatives (HoR) held its fourth session to date to discuss and vote on the legislation for a constitutional referendum.

On 1 August, the Special Deterrence Force (Rada) killed a man thought to be from the al-Burga militia in the Tajoura area of Tripoli. On 2 August, forces under Ghneiwa al-Kikli captured a clothes and textile factory in the Al-Hadba al-Badry area of Tripoli. On 31 July and 1 August, a series of clashes occurred between the Surman CID and the al-Nasr militia.

On 26 July, the first unofficial joint patrol between the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) 128 brigade and the Sirte Protection Force (SPF) was conducted along the Sirte-Jufra road. This region has seen multiple reports of recent of ISIS activity.

On 18 July, Fathi al-Majbary announced from Benghazi that he would no longer be a member of the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Presidential Council (PC), calling the GNA a ‘farce’ and arguing that no central government could be run from Tripoli due to the influence the militias there.

On 10 July, Khalifa Haftar ordered all LNA-affiliated Petroleum Facilities Guards to allow oil ports under their control to resume exports under the authority of the Tripoli-based NOC and its subsidiaries. On 11 July, the NOC lifted force majeure on all of the Oil Crescent ports and Tobruq’s Hariga port.

On 6 July, the GNA issued a decree instating the commander of the Zintan Special Operations Force, Emad Trabelsi, as the President of the General Security Directorate. On 7 July, clashes took between Abdelghani al-Kikli aka Ghneiwa forces from Abu Slim and a former militia leader under his command.

On 2 July, the internationally-recognised National Oil Corporation (NOC) declared force majeure on crude exports from Zueitina and Hariga oil ports. The NOC’s latest move comes in response to the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) decision on 25 June to transfer control of the Oil Crescent oil ports to the parallel Benghazi-based NOC.

On 25 June, the LNA spokesperson Ahmed al-Mismari stated that Khalifa Haftar had ordered that the all ports ‘liberated’ from Ibrahim Jadhran forces on 21 June by the LNA were to be handed over to the Benghazi-based National Oil Corporation, under the auspices of the Bayda-based parallel (interim) government led by Abdullah al-Thinni.